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Abstract 
 
Here, I examine the mechanism by which the rate of time preference (RTP) of government is 
formed and present a model of government RTP. The RTP of government has been largely 
neglected in the study of economics, but it is an important factor in inflation acceleration. The 
model presented indicates that the RTP of government is determined by the expected RTPs of 
the median voter and the representative household, as well as the strength of the government’s 
fluid intelligence. The model also indicates, however, that households actually use “beliefs” or 
heuristics to generate their expected RTPs of government. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The rate of time preference (RTP) of government has been largely neglected in the study of 
economics. This neglect has probably continued because it has been widely believed that the 
RTP of government is naturally identical to the RTP of the representative household; therefore, 
emphasizing the RTP of government is a meaningless exercise. However, to the best of my 
knowledge, there is no evidence that the RTP of government is identical to the RTP of the 
representative household. Rather, it is more natural to think that they are intrinsically different 
because, according to the median voter theorem (e.g., Downs, 1957), a government basically 
represents the median voter, which is different from the mean voter (i.e., the representative 
household).  
 In addition, Harashima (2004, 2015) showed that the RTP of government plays an 
essential role in inflation. Harashima indicated that differences between the RTPs of 
government and the representative household are the main cause of inflation acceleration. 
Therefore, households must know the RTP of government to behave rationally. However, 
because the RTP of government is not openly visible or otherwise discernable, households must 
expect its future value, and to expect it, they need a structural model of the government’s RTP 
that describes how it is formed. Again, to the best of my knowledge, no such model has been 
presented. The purposes of this paper are to examine the mechanisms by which the RTP of 
government is formed and to present a model of its formation. 
 An important feature of government RTP is that, if a government behaves on the basis 
of its intrinsic RTP, inflation generally accelerates, as Harashima’s (2004, 2015) model of 
inflation shows. However, if households do not want inflation to accelerate and ask their 
government not to accelerate inflation, how should the government behave? Unless the 
government changes its RTP to be equal to the RTP of the representative household, no future 
path that satisfies all optimality conditions of government exists under the condition of no 
inflation acceleration. Hence, if a government adheres to its intrinsic preference, rational 
behavior in the sense that, given the available information, optimal decisions to achieve the 
objective are taken, is impossible. In this case, preference and rationality conflict. If rationality 
prevails over preference, a government will change its RTP, but if not, the RTP of government 
will remain at its intrinsic value. Households, which need to generate expected values for the 
RTP of government, must first decide whether preference or rationality prevails in government. 
Models of the government’s RTP should include the mechanism by which households evaluate 
how the government deals with this inherent contradiction between preference and rationality.  
 Another important feature of government RTP is that, even if the functional form of a 
model of a government’s RTP is known, it is difficult to generate the expectation of a 
government’s RTP because it is difficult to know the parameter values in the model. To 
determine the model parameter values of government RTP, it is necessary to obtain a 
sufficiently large amount of data on the value of the median voter’s RTP as well as the RTPs of 
the representative household, but in practice this is a very difficult task. Therefore, households 
have to use “beliefs” or heuristics to determine the expected RTP of the government.  
 
2  NECESSITY OF EXPECTING GOVERNMENT 
RTP 
 
2.1  Law of motion for inflation 
The model constructed by Harashima (2015) is used as the model of inflation in this paper. The 
details of the model are shown in the Appendix. The model indicates that the law of motion for 
inflation is described by  
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where πt is the inflation rate at time t, θG is the RTP of government, and θP is the RTP of the 
representative household. θG and θP are not necessarily identical. Equation (1) is the same as 
Equation (A19) in the Appendix. Equation (1) indicates that inflation accelerates or decelerates 
as a result of the government and the representative household reconciles the contradiction in 
heterogeneous RTPs. A solution of the integral Equation (1) for given θG and θP is 
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Generally, the path of inflation that satisfies Equation (1) for t0  is expressed as 
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where zt is a time-dependent variable. The stream of zt varies, depending on the boundary 
condition. However, if πt satisfies Equation (1) for t0 , and  tπ  for 11  t , then  
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A proof is shown by Harashima (2008). Any inflation path that satisfies Equation (1) for t0  
therefore asymptotically approaches the path of Equation (2).  
 
2.2  Need to construct a structural model of θG to generate 
expectations 
All households behave (i.e., choose their optimal paths) on the basis of the expectation of future 
inflation. The model shown in Section 2.1 indicates that, to expect future inflation, households 
must know the future value of the government’s RTP (θG). There is no guarantee that θG and the 
RTPs of households will be constant across time; rather, the RTPs of government and 
households will be intrinsically temporally variable. However, households cannot even know 
the present value of θG directly, because households and the government are different entities 
and do not inherently know each other’s preferences. Therefore, households must somehow 
generate expectations of the future values of θG by calculating them on the basis of a structural 
model of the government’s RTP. Thereby, they must first construct such a model.  
 
3  PREFERENCE VS. RATIONALITY 
 
The law of motion for inflation discussed in Section 2.1 indicates that, if the government 
behaves on the basis of its intrinsic RTP, inflation will accelerate. On the other hand, if people 
strongly dislike inflation acceleration, a government has to behave so as to not accelerate 
inflation; however, this conflicts with its own intrinsic preference.  
 
3.1  The conflict between preference and rationality 
Behaving on the basis of its own intrinsic preferences does not mean that a government acts in a 
stupid, foolish, or irrational manner; rather, it behaves quite normally by naturally adhering to 
its intrinsic preferences. A fundamental question arises, however: Even if the government is 
acting quite normally, is this behavior rational? In economics, rationality usually means that, 
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given the available information, optimal decisions are made to achieve an objective, and rational 
behavior is generally assumed. However, can rational behavior still prevail when a government 
cannot optimize its behavior to achieve its objective? This special situation emerges if the 
central bank is perfectly independent and is firmly determined to stabilize inflation and if, at the 
same time, the intrinsic time preference rate of government is unchangeable. In this situation, 
the economy will become severely destabilized because it is impossible to satisfy Equation (1). 
Therefore, the government cannot achieve its objective (i.e., cannot maximize its expected 
utility) and can behave only irrationally. Conversely, if the government wants to optimize its 
objective and behave rationally, it must change its time preference. Clearly, trade-offs between 
rationality and time preference exist in some situations, and either rationality or time preference 
must be endogenized.  
 Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that people will not optimize their behavior to meet 
their objectives (i.e., maximize utility) if they have complete knowledge of the optimal path. 
Hence, rationality should prevail over preferences, and time preference will be endogenized 
when a clash between rationality and time preference occurs. If time preference is endogenized, 
rational decisions become possible. Even though rationality should eventually prevail over 
preferences, governments will not easily change their own preferences. They will resist 
endogenizing them and search for options to escape from doing so—it is this stubborn nature 
that drives a government to deviate from the path specified by its central bank. Even though 
unfavorable consequences are expected if no change is made, it can be very difficult to change 
one’s own preferences alone. Controlling preferences therefore usually requires the help of 
other people or institutions; this is one of the reasons why independent central banks were 
established to stabilize inflation.  
 If a central bank is not sufficiently independent, the government must change its RTP 
on its own so as to not accelerate inflation. A government must then rein in its preferences on its 
own. The RTP of government, therefore, is determined through the struggle between preference 
and rationality inside the government. If rationality prevails, inflation does not accelerate, but if 
preference prevails, inflation will accelerate.   
 
3.2  Two environments 
Models are simplified representations of reality. Therefore, models can be classified by how far 
the chosen model simplifies reality. In particular, models are classified by whether they are 
based on the assumption that all agents are homogeneous (i.e., a homogeneous environment) or 
on the assumption that agents are heterogeneous (i.e., a heterogeneous environment).    
 In models based on a homogeneous environment, it is usually assumed that rationality 
always prevails over preference, because it has generally been regarded that there is no conflict 
between preference and rationality in a homogeneous environment. In general, the dominance of 
rationality in a homogeneous environment has been undoubted (i.e., the rational expectation 
hypothesis has been accepted).  
 On the other hand, dominance of rationality in a heterogeneous environment is not 
necessarily guaranteed because, unlike in a homogeneous environment, serious contradictions 
between preference and rationality arise in a heterogeneous environment. For example, Becker 
(1980) showed that, if the RTPs of households are heterogeneous, the most patient household 
will eventually own all the capital in an economy and the other households cannot achieve 
optimality. That is, all households except the most patient household cannot behave rationally in 
the sense that rational households behave in such a way to achieve optimality, if they adhere to 
their own intrinsic RTPs. Harashima (2004, 2015) showed another case. If a government 
adheres to its own intrinsic RTP that is higher than the RTP of the representative household, 
inflation accelerates. If people dislike inflation acceleration and thereby the government has to 
behave under the condition that it does not accelerate inflation, there is no path that satisfies all 
optimality conditions for the government as long as it adheres to its own intrinsic RTP. In a 
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heterogeneous environment, therefore, conflicts between preference and rationality can occur. 
 
3.3  Necessary intelligence 
The struggle between preference and rationality is dealt with in the human brain. To resolve 
conflicts, humans need particular powers or functions—that is, different types of intelligence.  
 
3.3.1  Sustainability in a union or society 
Properly dealing with the struggle between preference and rationality is essential for humans 
because humans do not live alone—they are social and live in groups. However, the struggle has 
the potential to destroy a society. In a heterogeneous environment, if preference prevails over 
rationality, there is no guarantee that a political union or society is sustainable because some 
members of society cannot achieve optimality. In theory, this problem does not exist in a 
homogeneous environment, because the conflict basically does not exist and competitive 
equilibria are optimal for all people. On the other hand, in a heterogeneous environment, 
competitive equilibria are not necessarily optimal for all people because people have 
heterogeneous preferences, as discussed in Section 3.2. Many of the people who cannot achieve 
optimality will strongly oppose the government or other people, and it is likely that the political 
union or society will collapse, possibly violently.  
 A political union or society is formed and maintained because it provides benefits to 
its members. Behaviors that support a union or society are important for humans to survive. The 
type of potential vulnerability in heterogeneous environments that is discussed above indicates 
that various types of intelligence are essential to properly manage the struggle between 
preference and rationality.  
 
3.3.1.1  Calculations 
In a heterogeneous environment, relationships among people are far more complicated than in a 
homogeneous environment because people do not all behave in the same way in a 
heterogeneous environment. Humans must possess the intelligence to cope with these 
complicated relationships. They need to be able to calculate the outcomes of various activities in 
a heterogeneous group of people, evaluate the outcomes, and select the best action to take 
among many options in their brains.  
 The number of calculations required to reach an optimal solution is far larger in a 
heterogeneous environment than in a homogeneous one because the number of types of people 
that must be considered and the number of interconnections among heterogeneous people are far 
greater in a heterogeneous environment. If each person’s brain can cope with this extremely 
large number of calculations, people can behave rationally (i.e., always take the best actions that 
are calculated to be optimal, that is, the ones that are consistent with the model) even in a 
heterogeneous environment. If this does not occur, rationality may not prevail over preference. 
 
3.3.1.2  Evaluation 
After a variety of potential outcomes are calculated, many options are evaluated on the basis of 
the results of calculations to select the optimal option. Therefore, people must have the 
intelligence to evaluate options. The optimal future path is more complicated in a heterogeneous 
environment than in a homogeneous environment, because households act differently. The 
intelligence needed for evaluation allows people to accurately identify the optimal future path 
by comparing and evaluating various aspects of many different complicated paths.  
 
3.3.1.3  Self-control  
In addition, another type of intelligence is required—that which allows people to align their 
preferences so as to follow the optimal option. Even if an optimal option is appropriately 
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calculated and evaluated, the optimal option cannot be implemented if people’s preferences are 
not properly controlled. That is, people must exercise self-control. This type of intelligence 
applies to other activities as well—for example, when a person is on a diet. Children often have 
difficulty exercising self-control because this type of intelligence is not yet fully developed in 
childhood. In addition, it seems highly likely that it is also not necessarily sufficiently 
developed in many adults, and even adults will often lose the battle when forced to choose an 
option that is against their own preferences.  
 
3.3.2  Intelligence needed when the three types of subordinate 
intelligence are deficient 
It remains unclear whether humans are sufficiently equipped with the necessary types of 
intelligence to deal with the calculation, evaluation, and self-control aspects of decision-making 
in a heterogeneous environment. For example, the capacity of a human’s brain may be 
insufficient to process the extremely large number of calculations necessary in a heterogeneous 
environment. If this first type of intelligence is insufficient, it will be even more difficult to 
evaluate which option is appropriate to prevent disrupting the political union or society. 
Furthermore, even if the intelligence needed for calculations is sufficient, actions taken will not 
be optimal if the evaluation process is biased or poor.    
 If any part of the three subordinate intelligences is deficient, however, humans still 
have alternative methods to employ. For example, they can use approximations. The number of 
calculations needed will be significantly reduced if an appropriate approximation method is 
used. The intelligence needed for approximation is likely basically different from the three types 
of subordinate intelligence, although there may be partial overlap between them. For appropriate 
approximations, the concept of “fluid intelligence” will be particularly important. 
 
3.3.3  Fluid intelligence 
In psychology and psychometrics, many types of intelligence have been considered, including 
fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, short-term memory, long-term storage and retrieval, 
reading and writing ability, and visual processing. Among these, the importance of the 
difference between fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence has been particularly 
emphasized. According to Cattell (1963, 1971), fluid intelligence is the capacity to solve new 
kinds of problems logically, independent of acquired knowledge. This type of intelligence 
signifies the ability to deal with new situations without relying on knowledge gained at school 
or through experience. With the help of fluid intelligence, people can flexibly adapt their 
thinking to new kinds of problems or situations. By contrast, crystallized intelligence is the 
capacity to acquire and use previously obtained knowledge. 
 Fluid intelligence is essential when people make approximate calculations and need to 
judge which approximation is the best among many choices. These judgments are very difficult 
because we do not know the true values. Therefore, judgments must be made after 
comprehensive consideration of various choices. Such judgments represent “something new” in 
the sense that they will not necessarily be judged as best in future periods and under different 
circumstances. People need to make new judgments in any future period. That is, we must solve 
an “unknown problem” on each occasion to make the best approximation. Thus, these 
judgments are innovations that are made by using a person’s fluid intelligence. Fluid 
intelligence is therefore essential in a heterogeneous environment.  
 These types of judgments are similar to decisions made in politics. Political conditions 
change from moment to moment. Yesterday’s optimal political decision may be a non-optimal 
political decision today. Furthermore, nobody knows for certain whether today’s political 
decision is truly optimal. Historians examine whether past political decisions were optimal, but 
there are many political decisions over which even historians cannot reach consensus about their 
optimality.  
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3.4  The degree of rationality in a heterogeneous environment 
3.4.1  The item response theory 
Fluid intelligence can be modeled on the basis of the item response theory, which is used widely 
in psychometric studies (e.g., Lord and Novick, 1968; van der Linden and Hambleton, 1997). In 
particular, the item response function is used to describe the relationship between abilities and 
item responses. 
 A typical item response function is  
 
     bμae
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1
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where p~  is the probability of a correct response (e.g., answer) to an item (e.g., test or question), 
μ~ (∞ > μ~ > -∞) is a parameter that indicates an individual’s ability, a~ (> 0) is a parameter that 
characterizes the slope of the function, b
~
(∞ ≥ b
~
≥ -∞) is a parameter that represents the 
difficulty of an item, and c~  (1 ≥ c~ ≥ 0) is a parameter that indicates the probability that an item 
can be answered correctly by chance.  
 
3.4.2  The probability of dominance of rationality 
How frequently rationality prevails over preference can be modeled with an item response 
function. Let FI be the degree of fluid intelligence in a person. Larger values of FI indicate 
stronger fluid intelligence in the sense that a person more correctly grasps (approximates) a 
situation by using fluid intelligence. Let also pHE be the probability that rationality prevails over 
preference in a heterogeneous environment. On the basis of the item response theory, pHE can be 
modeled as a function of FI such that  
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where aˆ (> 0) is a parameter that characterizes the slope of the function, bˆ (∞ ≥ bˆ ≥ -∞) is a 
parameter that represents the difficulty and complexity of a situation, and cˆ  (1 ≥ cˆ ≥ 0) is a 
parameter that indicates the probability that rationality prevails over preference by exogenous 
factors. If FI is sufficiently large, rationality almost always prevails over preference in a 
heterogeneous environment, but if it is very small, preference almost always prevails over 
rationality.  
 An important implication of Equation (3) is that the rational expectation hypothesis is 
not necessarily acceptable in a heterogeneous environment. If FI is small (i.e., fluid intelligence 
is weak), preference will often prevail over rationality and thus the rational expectation 
hypothesis cannot be unconditionally accepted.  
 
3.5  Fluid intelligence of government 
According to the median voter theorem (e.g., Downs, 1957), a government behaves just as the 
median voter prefers in a one-person one-vote democratic political system. This theorem 
suggests that the fluid intelligence of government is equal to that of the median voter. On the 
other hand, the top-level positions in government are usually occupied by the best and brightest 
in a country, and they will almost certainly have stronger fluid intelligence than the median 
voter. However, does that mean these officials will make decisions that are different from those 
of the median voter? If they do so, they will be forced to step down in the next election 
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according to the median voter theorem. Only politicians who make the same decisions as the 
median voter will be able to occupy top-level positions. Hence, it is likely that the fluid 
intelligence of government is practically equal to that of the median voter when dealing with 
issues in which preference and rationality conflict.  
 
3.6  The nature of cˆ  
The value of cˆ  is affected by exogenous factors. For example, if the central bank is 
sufficiently independent and capable, cˆ  becomes unity—that is, the central bank makes 
rationality always prevail over preference with regard to the RTP of government. The 
government is always forced to change its RTP as the central bank orders. It is likely that many 
institutions or mechanisms work to raise the value of cˆ . For example, constitutions, laws, 
treaties, and many government and international organizations will raise the value of cˆ  by 
urging governments to maintain rationality. Such institutions and mechanisms have probably 
been adopted in many societies, because experience has taught us that they help ensure that 
rationality prevails over preference in a heterogeneous environment. As new institutions or 
mechanisms were invented and adopted, the probability that rationality prevails over preference 
may have gradually increased (by increasing the value of cˆ ) through time. Therefore, it is 
likely that, as civilization has progressed, cˆ  has increased, and rationality more frequently 
prevails over preference in a heterogeneous environment.  
 
4  A MODEL OF GOVERNMENT RTP 
 
4.1  Determinants of θG  
The value of θG will usually be equal to the RTP of the median voter, as discussed in Section 3.5. 
However, in some cases, other elements will also affect the value of θG. The determinants of θG 
will be basically classified into the following two elements.  
 
4.1.1  Preference element  
In this paper, I call the determinant that is equal to that of the median voter’s RTP the 
“preference element.” This element usually determines the main body of θG. Let θG,pre be the 
preference element component of θG, and θP,med be the intrinsic RTP of the median voter. As 
discussed in Section 3.5, the intrinsic θG,pre is basically equal to the intrinsic θP,med in a 
one-person one-vote democratic political system. Therefore, in the following sections, I assume 
that θG,pre = θP,med.  
 
4.1.2  Political element 
The determinant that is peculiar to the government’s RTP is the “political element.” Let θG,pol be 
the political element component of θG. If a political system is maintained and stable forever, the 
political element will be nil, and θG will be determined only by the preference element. 
However, if a political system is unstable, the political element component is not zero, and it 
increases as the political system becomes more unstable. Although rare, it is possible for a 
political system to collapse. There are many historical examples of the collapse of a political 
system. These have been often observed, for example, after a defeat in a large-scale war or after 
a revolution. The political element is of great significance when a political system is on the 
brink of collapse. Faced with an impending collapse of the system, the incumbent government 
will do anything possible to survive the crisis. From the government’s perspective, the far future 
is meaningless—survival is the primary objective. It imposes taxes and increases expenditures 
so as to avoid immediate collapse. As a result, its actions become increasingly myopic and 
impatient in the sense that it does not concern itself with future economic conditions. This 
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behavior indicates an increase in θG,pol.   
 For most democratic countries, the probability of an imminent collapse of the political 
system will be negligible, and we may assume that θG,pol is zero in those countries, but the 
political element is very important in politically unstable countries. 
 
4.2  The model 
Section 3 indicates that pHE needs to be expected to generate an expected θG,pre. Let pHE,G be the 
pHE of the government and pHE,P be the pHE of the median voter. Because basically θG,pre = θP,med 
as discussed in Section 4.1, pHE,G = pHE,P generally, and thereby it is reasonable to assume that 
pHE,G = pHE,P. Therefore, in a one-person one-vote political system,  
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where FIP,med is the FI of the median voter. Equation (4) indicates that the smaller FIP,med is, the 
smaller pHE,G is and the higher the probability of inflation acceleration. 
 Suppose that the central bank is not independent of the government. Thereby, the 
government has to control its RTP by itself, that is, without being forced to so by the central 
bank. (The case for an independent central bank is discussed in Section 4.4.) Suppose also for 
simplicity that the probability that a political system is on the brink of collapse is pinst and θG,pol 
takes a unique positive value, and the probability of a stable political system is then 1– pinst and 
θG,pol = 0. The model of the government’s RTP that is used to generate the expected RTP of 
government is therefore  
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Equation (5) indicates that the RTP of government is equal to θP when rationality prevails over 
preference with the probability pHE,G. When preference prevails over rationality with the 
probability 1 – pHE,G, the RTP of government is equal to the intrinsic RTP of government. The 
intrinsic RTP of government consists of θG,pol with the probability pinst and θG,pre. 
 Because θG,pre = θP,med (as assumed in Section 4.1.1), then by Equation (5),  
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 In most democratic countries, the probability of the occurrence of extreme political 
instability is very low. For those countries, therefore, the model is reduced to a more simple 
form by assuming instp = 0 such that 
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 Note that if the people and the government have sufficiently strong fluid intelligences, 
an independent central bank may not be necessary. However, pHE will not be unity even in a 
country whose people have the highest pHE in the world. Therefore, it is possible for θG > θP in 
some period in any country; thus, an independent central bank is still important for all countries.  
 
4.3  Generating an expected θG by using heuristics 
4.3.1  Difficulty in expecting θG  
Specifying the functional form of the structural model of θG is only half of the problem of 
generating an expected θG. Although we have the functional form of the model, as shown in 
Equation (7), we still cannot generate an expected θG unless we specify appropriate values of the 
parameters aˆ , bˆ  and cˆ . Furthermore, to generate the expected θG, we must also know the 
expected values of θP, θP,med, and FIP,med.   
 We may roughly specify the parameter values of aˆ , bˆ  and cˆ  through the results 
of some type of social experiment, or we may use the estimates derived from other kinds of 
model concerning fluid intelligence. By substituting these values for the parameter values in the 
structural model of θG, the model could be calibrated. However, expectations based on these 
estimates will most likely be rather inaccurate and therefore problematic in terms of 
decision-making on future actions.   
 A far more serious problem is obtaining the expected future values of θP, θP,med, and 
FIP,med. It is not certain whether the values of θP and θP,med are constant across time; in fact, 
many researchers have posited that it is much more likely that they are temporally variable (e.g., 
Uzawa, 1968; Epstein and Hynes, 1983; Lucas and Stokey, 1984; Parkin, 1988; Obstfeld, 1990; 
Becker and Mulligan, 1997). Therefore, there is no guarantee that the future values of θP and 
θP,med will equal past ones, so the past values cannot be used as substitutes for the expected 
future values of θP and θP,med. Hence, to generate the expected future values of θP and θP,med, we 
have to calculate them on the basis of structural models of θP and θP,med. Even if we knew the 
functional forms of these structural models, we would still need to determine the parameter 
values for the models. To determine them, however, we would need to obtain a sufficiently 
large amount of data on the past values of θP and θP,med—that is, the intrinsic RTPs of the 
representative household and the median voter. Although a household knows its own RTP, it 
cannot directly observe θP and θP,med in the same way that it can obtain data on aggregate 
consumption, investment, production, inflation, trade, and other indicators at relatively low cost. 
Without data on the past values of θP and θP,med, we cannot estimate the parameter values. 
Therefore, we cannot generate the expected future values of θP and θP,med on the basis of their 
structural models. 
 Past data on the real interest rate may be used as a substitute for past θP because θP is 
basically equal to the real interest rate at steady state (Fisher, 1930). However, during a 
transition period after θP changes, θP is not equal to the rate of real interest. Therefore, unless θP 
is constant across time, this substitution does not seem to be sufficiently useful. In addition, if 
θP,med is constant across time, we may approximate the value of θP,med on the basis of historical 
economic and political (election) data. However, as stated in the previous paragraph, it is not 
known whether θP and θP,med are constant across time.  
 Note that, if we assume that RTP is identical for all households, an expected θP and 
θP,med are no longer necessary because the RTP of any household is equal to both θP and θP,med. 
This assumption is very problematic, however, because it is not merely expedient for the sake of 
simplicity. It is also a critical requirement to eliminate the need for generating an expected θP 
and θP,med. Therefore, any rationale for assuming identical RTPs should be validated; that is, it 
should be demonstrated that identical RTPs do exist and are universally observed. In any case, 
RTP is unquestionably not identical among households. Therefore, households must generate 
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the expected values of θP and θP,med. 
 
4.3.2  Expectations based on beliefs 
Faced with the difficulty of generating expected values of θP and θP,med and knowing the 
parameter values in the model of θG, households may have to use the concept of bounded 
rationality to make decisions. One of a few alternatives available for a household to use is its 
“beliefs” in θP and θP,med as well as in aˆ , bˆ , cˆ , and FIP,med. The use of beliefs does not mean 
that households deviate from rationality; rather, it is the most rational option in an environment 
where insufficient information is available.  
 Belief is merely that, however—belief. There is no guarantee that the value a 
household believes to be true is actually the correct value. Therefore, it may often change, but it 
will be changed only if forward-looking information becomes available. In some cases, a 
household will change its belief when new data are obtained, but in other cases the household 
will not, depending on how it interprets the new information. This is particularly true when the 
household believes that it has extracted forward-looking information about θP and θP,med from 
the newly obtained data.  
 
4.3.3  Heuristics 
When households interpret the information extracted from new data, they may use heuristic 
methods such as a simplified linear reduced form model of θG. Studies of the use of heuristics 
and bounded rationality in this context would be useful for better understanding the 
interpretation mechanism. Heuristic methods will be implemented through the use of fluid 
intelligence. Hence, the value of FIP,med will also be important in improving the accuracy of 
expectations generated on the basis of heuristics.  
 There may be many possible simplified linear reduced form models of θG that could be 
used as heuristic methods, although most of them may be ad hoc. Even though such reduced 
form models are far less credible than a structural model, they may be utilized as a heuristic 
method of interpretation. Although simplified linear reduced form models may often result in 
misleading conclusions, they may sometimes provide useful information.  
 
4.4  Independent central bank 
4.4.1  Generating expected θG – θP through the actions of a central 
bank 
A heuristic way of generating an expected θG is to use information about θG – θP. The model of 
inflation acceleration presented in Section 2 indicates that inflation acceleration and 
deceleration are governed by the value of θG – θP. Therefore, what people really need to know is 
not the expected θG but the expected θG – θP. If the central bank is sufficiently independent, θG 
is determined by the central bank. In this case, people do not need to know the RTP of the 
government, but rather the responses of the central bank to θG – θP. If an easy method exists to 
know the response of the central bank to θG – θP, households will not have to generate expected 
θG; they need only observe the decisions of the central bank.  
 Of course, people cannot directly observe the value of θG – θP, but they can observe 
the response of the central bank to θG – θP. An independent central bank will raise interest rates 
if it judges that θG – θP > 0. Households can then adjust their expectations accordingly. 
 
4.4.2  Guaranteed θG = θP 
If the central bank is sufficiently independent and capable, and successfully controls θG, then it 
is not even necessary for households to generate an expected value for θG – θP because, in this 
case, θG will also equal θP. As discussed in Section 3.6, if the central bank is sufficiently 
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independent and capable, then cˆ = 1 in Equation (4) and thereby, by Equations (6) and (7), θG = 
θP. The central bank ensures that rationality always prevails over preference with regard to the 
RTP of government. If the independence of the central bank is very credible, households will 
always expect that θG = θP at all times in the future.  
 
5  EXPLANATIONS FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF 
INFLATION BASED ON THE MODEL 
 
5.1  Hyperinflation 
5.1.1  Hyperinflation in chaotic times  
The political element discussed in Section 4.1.2 will play an important role in chaotic 
political and economic times. In these situations, people may judge that the probability of 
collapse of the incumbent political system (pinst) is currently very high. If they do so, the 
political element term G,polinstθp  in Equation (6) will substantially increase. In addition, the 
central bank will become largely powerless in these unstable periods, and pHE,G will be left at 
less than unity. Equation (6) indicates that θG is far larger than θP in these cases. As a result, 
according to the law of motion for inflation shown in Section 2, hyperinflation will be generated. 
The hyperinflation scenarios in Germany after its defeat in WWI, in Japan after its defeat in 
WWII, and in Russia after the collapse of Soviet Union are typical examples. Nevertheless, if 
some external or internal forces can successfully establish political stability immediately after 
these types of major political upheaval, hyperinflation may be deterred. 
 
5.1.2  Hyperinflation in periods of peace 
The preference element can also generate hyperinflation. In other words, hyperinflation can be 
generated even in periods of peace. Equations (6) and (7) indicate that a small value of pHE,G 
indicates a high probability of inflation acceleration. A small value of pHE,G indicates weak fluid 
intelligence, and in this case preference prevails over rationality more often and for longer 
periods of time. Hence, inflation accelerates gradually and persistently because relatively small 
but positive values of θG – θP are successively generated over a long period. Initially, the 
acceleration of inflation is slower than in the case of hyperinflation caused by the political 
element, but according to the law of motion for inflation shown in Section 2, this type of 
inflation also eventually grows to hyperinflation.   
 The hyperinflation caused by a relatively small value of pHE,G requires the additional 
condition that the central bank is not sufficiently independent. If the central bank is sufficiently 
independent and capable, cˆ  in Equation (3) is unity, and thereby rationality always prevails 
over preference and hyperinflation is not generated.   
 
5.2  Modest or creeping inflation 
If the value of pHE,G is not low but also not sufficiently high, a relatively high inflation rate but 
not hyperinflation may be generated. In this case, a small positive θG – θP is periodically 
generated for a short period, and moderate inflation will be observed. Note that this kind of 
inflation also requires the condition that the central bank is not sufficiently independent, because 
if it is sufficiently independent, inflation does not accelerate. 
 The Great Inflation observed in developed countries in 1960s and 1970s is a typical 
example of modest or creeping inflation. pHE,P (= pHE,G) in developed countries during this 
period may have been sufficiently high, but a Great Inflation was nonetheless generated. This 
appears to be a puzzle, and there are two possible solutions. The first possibility is that pHE,P (= 
pHE,G) in those countries was not sufficiently high enough, and in addition, central banks were 
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not sufficiently independent during those periods. If pHE,P (= pHE,G) is not sufficiently high, a 
small positive θG – θP can be periodically generated. If this small θG – θP is not prevented by the 
central bank, inflation will gradually accelerate.  
 The second possibility is that pHE,P (= pHE,G) in the developed countries was 
sufficiently high, but people in those countries were using the wrong models to generate 
expectations of the future economy. That is, expectations may have been systematically biased 
for some reason. An important difference between this period and later periods is that 
Keynesian thought was dominant in this period, but not in others. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
Keynesian thought was accepted by most economists, government officials, and the general 
public. Part of the Keynesian point of view was that inflation is a necessary evil to maintain a 
low unemployment rate. Many economists at the time took this as an authoritative theorem. 
Because rationality means that optimal decisions are made from the choices calculated 
consistently with the model used, and because most people believed in Keynesian thought, it 
would have been rational for most people to use models that were consistent with Keynesian 
thought when generating expectations of the future economy.   
According to Keynesian theory, the government’s behavior in maintaining low 
unemployment rates indicates that higher inflation will be allowed by the government; thus, θG 
that is higher than θP must be optimal. People who believe in the Keynesian way of thinking 
therefore should expect high values of θG and positive values of θG – θP. As a result, even if 
pHE,P (= pHE,G) is sufficiently high, a positive θG – θP can periodically be expected. In addition, if 
the central bank is not independent, the expectation of a positive θG – θP cannot be prevented, 
and thereby a modest or creeping inflation can be generated. Even if the central bank is 
sufficiently independent, this kind of inflation may be generated if the central bank itself also 
follows the Keynesian line of thought, because it will not prevent the generation of expected 
positive values of θG – θP.   
 At the present time, the conjecture that inflation is a necessary evil to maintain a low 
unemployment rate is much less common than in the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, most people 
will not use models that are constructed on the basis of this conjecture. It seems unlikely that a 
phenomenon such as the Great Inflation will occur again in developed countries.  
 
5.3  Disinflation 
After a period of high inflation, if a negative θG – θP is maintained, inflation will decline. In the 
1980s, after a prolonged period of inflation, inflation gradually declined in many developed 
countries. This is often called the “Volcker” disinflation (named after the twelfth Chairman of 
the U.S. Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker). It is highly likely that the central banks during this 
period forced governments to lower their θG to ensure that θG – θP was negative until inflation 
stabilized. There are two possible reasons for this successful disinflation, depending on the two 
possible sources of the Great Inflation discussed above: Central banks may have become 
sufficiently independent of their governments in the 1980s, or Keynesian ideology was largely 
cast away. Most likely, both contributed to the disinflation.  
 
6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The RTP of government has been largely neglected in the study of economics. However, it is an 
important factor in inflation acceleration. In this paper, I examined the mechanisms by which 
the RTP of government is formed and presented a model of the government’s RTP. The model 
explicitly incorporates the mechanism of how a government deals with the contradiction 
between preference and rationality.  
 The model indicates that the RTP of government is determined by the expected RTPs 
of the median voter and the representative household, as well as by the strength of the 
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government’s fluid intelligence. It is, however, difficult in practice to use the model to generate 
the expected government RTP because it is difficult to generate the expected RTPs of the 
median voter and the representative household. Therefore, households most likely use “beliefs” 
or heuristics to generate the expected RTP of government. If the central bank is sufficiently 
independent and capable, households will always expect that θG = θP.   
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APPENDIX 
 
A1  The law of motion for inflation 
A1.1  The government 
A.1.1.1  The government budget constraint 
The government budget constraint is 
 
  
tttttt XGiBB 
  , 
 
where Bt is the nominal obligation of the government to pay for its accumulated bonds, it is the 
nominal interest rate for government bonds, Gt is the nominal government expenditure, Xt is the 
nominal tax revenue, and 
t  is the nominal amount of seigniorage at time t. The tax is assumed 
to be lump sum, the government bonds are long term, and the returns on the bonds are realized 
only after the bonds are held during a unit period (e.g., a year). The government bonds are 
redeemed in a unit period, and the government successively refinances the bonds by issuing new 
ones at each time t. Let 
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  be the inflation rate at time t. By dividing by Pt, the budget 
constraint is transformed to 
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, which is equivalent to 
 
  tttttttttttttt xgπibπbxgibb    .            (A1) 
 
 Because the returns on government bonds are realized only after holding the bonds 
during a unit period, investors buy the bonds if  dsrπEi
t
t
sstt 


1
 at time t, where 
ti  is 
the nominal interest rate for bonds bought at t and rt is the real interest rate in markets at t. 
Hence, by arbitrage,  dsrπEi
t
t
sstt 


1
 and if rt is constant such that rrt   (i.e., if it is at 
steady state), then 
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 . 
 
The nominal interest rate rdsπEi
t
t
stt  
1
 means that, during a sufficiently small period 
between t and t + dt, the government’s obligation to pay for the bonds’ return in the future 
increases not by  rπdt t   but by 

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
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. If πt is constant, then t
t
t
st πdsπE 
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and rπi tt  , but if πt is not constant, these equations do not necessarily hold. 
 Since bonds are redeemed in a unit period and successively refinanced, the bonds the 
government is holding at t have been issued between t - 1 and t. Hence, under perfect foresight, 
the average nominal interest rate for all government bonds at time t is the weighted sum of 
ti  
such that 
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where 
tsB ,  is the nominal value of bonds at time t that were issued at time s. If the weights 
 
t
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,
,  between t - 1 and t are not so different from each other, then approximately 
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. To be precise, if the absolute values of πs for 11  tst  are 
sufficiently smaller than unity, the differences among the weights are negligible and then 
approximately 
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(see Harashima, 2008). The average nominal interest rate for the total government bonds, 
therefore, develops by rdsdυπi
t
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tπ ; thus, rπi tt  . If πt is not constant, however, the equations t
t
t
s
s
υ πdsdυπ  

1
1
 
and it = πt + r do not necessarily hold.  
 
A1.1.2  An economically Leviathan government  
Under a proportional representation system, the government represents the median household 
whereas the representative household from an economic perspective represents the mean 
household.1 Because of this difference, they usually have different preferences. To account for 
this essential difference, a Leviathan government is assumed in the model.2 There are two 
extremely different views regarding government’s behavior in the literature on political 
economy: the Leviathan view and the benevolent view (e.g., Downs 1957; Brennan and 
Buchanan 1980; Alesina and Cukierman 1990). From an economic point of view, a benevolent 
government maximizes the expected economic utility of the representative household, but a 
Leviathan government does not. Whereas the expenditure of a benevolent government is a tool 
used to maximize the economic utility of the representative household, the expenditure of a 
Leviathan government is a tool used to achieve the government’s own policy objectives.3 For 
example, if a Leviathan government considers national security to be the most important 
political issue, defense spending will increase greatly, but if improving social welfare is the top 
political priority, spending on social welfare will increase dramatically, even though the 
increased expenditures may not necessarily increase the economic utility of the representative 
household. 
 Is it possible, however, for such a Leviathan government to hold office for a long 
period? Yes, because a government is generally chosen by the median of households under a 
                                                          
1 See the literature on the median voter theorem (e.g., Downs 1957). Also see the literature on the delay in reforms 
(e.g., Alesina and Drazen 1991; Cukierman et al. 1992). 
2 The most prominent reference to Leviathan governments is Brennan and Buchanan (1980). 
3 The government behavior assumed in the fiscal theory of the price level reflects an aspect of a Leviathan 
government. Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) argue that non-Ricardian policies correspond to the type of policies in 
which governments are viewed as selecting policies and committing themselves to those policies in advance of prices 
being determined in markets. 
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proportional representation system (e.g., Downs 1957), whereas the representative household 
usually presumed in the economics literature is the mean household. The economically 
representative household is not usually identical to the politically representative household, and 
a majority of people could support a Leviathan government even if they know that the 
government does not necessarily pursue only the economic objectives of the economically 
representative household. In other words, the Leviathan government argued here is an 
economically Leviathan government that maximizes the political utility of people, whereas the 
conventional economically benevolent government maximizes the economic utility of people. In 
addition, because the politically and economically representative households are different (the 
median and mean households, respectively), the preferences of future governments will also be 
similarly different from those of the mean representative household. In this sense, the current 
and future governments presented in the model can be seen as a combined government that goes 
on indefinitely; that is, the economically Leviathan government always represents the median 
representative household. 
 The Leviathan view generally requires the explicit inclusion of government 
expenditure, tax revenue, or related activities in the government’s political utility function (e.g., 
Edwards and Keen 1996). Because an economically Leviathan government derives political 
utility from expenditure for its political purposes, the larger the expenditure is, the happier the 
Leviathan government will be. But raising tax rates will provoke people’s antipathy, which 
increases the probability of being replaced by the opposing party that also nearly represents the 
median household. Thus, the economically Leviathan government regards taxes as necessary 
costs to obtain freedom of expenditure for its own purposes. The government therefore will 
derive utility from expenditure and disutility from taxes. Expenditure and taxes in the political 
utility function of the government are analogous to consumption and labor hours in the 
economic utility function of the representative household. Consumption and labor hours are 
both control variables, and as such, the government’s expenditure and tax revenue are also 
control variables. As a whole, the political utility function of economically Leviathan 
government can be expressed as uG(gt, xt).4 In addition, it can be assumed on the basis of 
previously mentioned arguments that 0


t
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g
u
 and 0
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, and therefore that 0
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u
.5 An economically Leviathan government therefore maximizes the expected 
sum of these utilities discounted by its time preference rate under the constraint of deficit 
financing. 
 
A1.1.3  The optimization problem 
The optimization problem of an economically Leviathan government is  
 
   dttθ,xguEMax GttG 

exp
0
 
                                                          
4 It is possible to assume that governments are partially benevolent. In this case, the utility function of a government 
can be assumed to be  ttttG l,c,x,gu , where ct is real consumption and lt is the leisure hours of the representative 
household. However, if a lump-sum tax is imposed, the government’s policies do not affect steady-state consumption 
and leisure hours. In this case, the utility function can be assumed to be  ttG x,gu . 
5 Some may argue that it is more likely that 
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important issue here because    
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  at steady state, as will be shown in the solution to 
the optimization problem later in the paper. Thus, the results are not affected by which assumption is used.  
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subject to the budget constraint 
 
   ttttttt xgπibb   ,                      (A3) 
 
where uG is the constant relative risk aversion utility function of the government, θG is the 
government’s rate of time preference, and E is the expectation operator. All variables are 
expressed in per capita terms, and population is assumed to be constant. The government 
maximizes its expected political utility considering the behavior of the economically 
representative household that is reflected in it in its budget constraint. 
 
A1.2  Households 
The economically representative household maximizes its expected economic utility. Sidrauski 
(1967)’s well-known money in the utility function model is used for the optimization problem. 
The representative household maximizes its expected utility 
 
   dttθm,cuE PttP 

exp
0
 
 
subject to the budget constraint 
 
       tttttttttt gmrπcσwara   , 
 
where uP and θP are the utility function and the time preference rate of the representative 
household, ct is real consumption, wt is real wage, σt is lump-sum real government transfers, mt 
is real money, at = kt + mt, and kt is real capital. It is assumed that rt = f’(kt), tw  
   ttt kfkkf  , 0'uP , 0"uP , 
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, where  f  is the 
production function. Government expenditure (gt) is an exogenous variable for the 
representative household because it is an economically Leviathan government. It is also 
assumed that, although all households receive transfers from a government in equilibrium, when 
making decisions, each household takes the amount it receives as given, independent of its 
money holdings. Thus, the budget constraint means that the real output  tkf  at any time is 
demanded for the real consumption ct, the real investment tk
 , and the real government 
expenditure gt such that   tttt gkckf   . The representative household maximizes its 
expected economic utility considering the behavior of government reflected in gt in the budget 
constraint. In this discussion, a central bank is not assumed to be independent of the 
government; thus, the functions of the government and the central bank are not separated. This 
assumption can be relaxed, and the roles of the government and the central bank are explicitly 
separated in Section A2. 
 Note that the time preference rate of government (θG) is not necessarily identical to 
that of the representative household (θP) because the government and the representative 
household represent different households (i.e., the median and mean households, respectively). 
In addition, the preferences will differ because (1) even though people want to choose a 
government that has the same time preference rate as the representative household, the rates 
may differ owing to errors in expectations (e.g., Alesina and Cukierman 1990); and (2) current 
voters cannot bind the choices of future voters and, if current voters are aware of this possibility, 
they may vote more myopically as compared with their own rates of impatience in private 
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economic activities (e.g., Tabellini and Alesina 1990). Hence, it is highly likely that the time 
preference rates of a government and the representative household are heterogeneous. It should 
be also noted, however, that even though the rates of time preference are heterogeneous, an 
economically Leviathan government behaves based only on its own time preference rate, 
without hesitation. 
 
A1.3  The simultaneous optimization 
First, I examine the optimization problem of the representative household. Let Hamiltonian HP 
be       ttttttttttP,PttPP gmrπcσwarλtθm,cuH  exp , where λP,t is a costate 
variable, ct and mt are control variables, and at is a state variable. The optimality conditions for 
the representative household are;  
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0lim 

ttP,
t
aλ  .                           (A8) 
 
By conditions (A4) and (A5), 
   
tt
t
ttP
t
ttP rπ
m
m,cu
c
m,cu











1
, and by conditions (A4) and 
(A6),  
 
   
tP
t
t
t
ttP
t
ttP
t rθ
c
c
c
m,cu
c
m,cu
c 













2
2
1
 .                (A9) 
 
Hence, 
 
θP = rt = r                             (A10) 
 
at steady state such that 0tc  and 0tk
 . 
 Next, I examine the optimization problem of the economically Leviathan government. 
Let Hamiltonian HG be       tttttttG,GttGG xgπibλtθx,guH  exp , where λG,t is a 
costate variable. The optimality conditions for the government are;  
 
 
  tG,G
t
ttG λtθ
g
x,gu



exp  ,                    (A11) 
 
 
  tG,G
t
ttG λtθ
x
x,gu



exp  ,                    (A12) 
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 tttG,tG, πiλλ   ,                         (A13) 
 
  ttttttt xgπibb   ,                    (A14) 
 
0lim 

ttG,
t
bλ  .                          (A15) 
 
Combining conditions (A11), (A12), and (A13) and Equation (A2) yields the following 
equations: 
 
   
t
t
t
s
s
υtttG
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t πdsdυπrπiθ
g
g
g
x,gu
g
x,gu
g 










  


1
1
2
2
1

    (A16) 
 
and  
 
   
t
t
t
s
s
υtttG
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t πdsdυπrπiθ
x
x
x
x,gu
x
x,gu
x 










  


1
1
2
2
1

 .   (A17) 
 
Here, 
   
0
2
2
1












t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
g
g
g
x,gu
g
x,gu
g

 and 
   
0
2
2
1












t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
x
x
x
x,gu
x
x,gu
x

 at 
steady state such that 0tg  and 0tx ; thus, 
 
t
t
t
s
s
υtG πdsdυπrθ   

1
1
 .                 (A18) 
 
Hence, by Equation (A10), 
 
PGt
t
t
s
s
υ θθπdsdυπ  

1
1
                   (A19) 
 
at steady state such that 0tg , 0tx , 0tc , and 0tk
 .6   
 Equation (A19) is a natural consequence of simultaneous optimization by the 
economically Leviathan government and the representative household. If the rates of time 
preference are heterogeneous between them, then 
 
  
t
t
t
s
s
υt πdsdυπri   

1
1
 . 
 
This result might seem surprising because it has been naturally conjectured that it = πt + r. 
However, this is a simple misunderstanding because πt indicates the instantaneous rate of 
                                                          
6 If and only if 
t
ttt
G
b
xg
θ


 at steady state, then the transversality condition (A15) 0lim 

ttG,
t
bλ  holds. 
The proof is shown in Harashima (2008). 
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inflation at a point such that 
t
t
t
P
P
π

 , whereas dsdυπ
t
t
s
s
υ 

1
1
 roughly indicates the 
average inflation rate in a period. Equation (A19) indicates that πt develops according to the 
integral equation 
PG
t
t
s
s
υt θθdsdυππ   

1
1
. If πt is constant, the equations rπi tt   and 
t
t
t
s
s
υ πdsdυπ  

1
1
 are true. However, if πt is not constant, the equations do not necessarily 
hold. Equation (A19) indicates that the equations rπi tt   and t
t
t
s
s
υ πdsdυπ  

1
1
 
hold only in the case where θG = θP (i.e., a homogeneous rate of time preference). It has been 
previously thought that a homogeneous rate of time preference naturally prevails; thus, the 
equation it = πt + r has not been questioned. As argued previously, however, a homogeneous 
rate of time preference is not usually guaranteed. 
 
A1.4  The law of motion for trend inflation 
Equation (A19) indicates that inflation accelerates or decelerates as a result of the government 
and the representative household reconciling the contradiction in heterogeneous rates of time 
preference. If πt is constant, the equation dsdυππ
t
t
s
s
υt  


1
1
 holds; conversely, if tπ  
dsdυπ
t
t
s
s
υ 

1
1
, then πt is not constant. Without the acceleration or deceleration of inflation, 
therefore, Equation (A19) cannot hold in an economy in which 
PG θθ  . In other words, it is 
not until 
PG θθ   that inflation can accelerate or decelerate. Heterogeneous time preferences 
(
PG θθ  ) bend the path of inflation and enables inflation to accelerate or decelerate. The 
difference of time preference rates (
PG θθ  ) at each time needs to be transformed to the 
accelerated or decelerated inflation rate πt at each time.  
     Equation (A19) implies that inflation accelerates or decelerates nonlinearly in the case in 
which 
PG θθ  . For a sufficiently small period dt, dttπ 1  is determined with πs  11  tst  
that satisfies 
PGt
t
t
s
s
υ θθπdsdυπ  

1
1
, so as to hold the equation dsdυπ
dtt
t
s
s
υ 
 1
 
tdtt
dtt
t
s
s
υ ππdsdυπ  



 
1
1
1
. A solution of the integral equation (A19) for given θG and 
θP is 
 
  20 6 tθθππ PGt   .                        (A20) 
 
Generally, the path of inflation that satisfies Equation (A19) for t0  is expressed as 
 
      tzθθππ tPGt lnexp60   , 
 
where zt is a time dependent variable. The stream of zt is various depending on the boundary 
condition, i.e., the past and present inflation during 01  t  and the path of inflation during 
10  t  that is set to make π0 satisfy Equation (A19). However, zt has the following important 
property. If πt satisfies Equation (A19) for t0 , and  tπ  for 11  t , then  
 
  2lim 

t
t
z  . 
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Proof is shown in Harashima (2008). Any inflation path that satisfies Equation (A19) for t0  
therefore asymptotically approaches the path of Equation (A20). The mechanism behind the law 
of motion for inflation (Equation [A20]) is examined more in detail in Harashima (2008). 
 
A2  The central bank 
A central bank manipulates the nominal interest rate according to the following Taylor-type 
instrument rule in the model; 
 
  tx*tπt xγππγγi   ,                     (A21) 
 
where π* is the target rate of inflation and γ , γπ, and γx are constant coefficients. rπγ
*   
as is usually assumed.  
 In Section A1, central banks are not explicitly considered because they are not 
assumed to be independent of governments. However, in actuality, central banks are 
independent organizations in most countries even though some of them are not sufficiently 
independent. Furthermore, in the conventional inflation model, it is the central banks that 
control inflation and governments have no role in controlling inflation. Conventional inflation 
models show that the rate of inflation basically converges at the target rate of inflation set by a 
central bank. The target rate of inflation therefore is the key exogenous variable that determines 
the path of inflation in these models.  
     Both the government and the central bank can probably affect the development of 
inflation, but they would do so in different manners, as Equation (A20) and conventional 
inflation models indicate. However, the objectives of the government and the central bank may 
not be the same. For example, if trend inflation is added to conventional models by replacing 
their aggregate supply equations with Equation (A20), inflation cannot necessarily converge at 
the target rate of inflation because another key exogenous variable (θG) is included in the 
models. A government makes inflation develop consistently with the Equation (A20), which 
implies that inflation will not necessarily converge at the target rate of inflation. Conversely, a 
central bank makes inflation converge at the target rate of inflation, which implies that inflation 
will not necessarily develop consistently with Equation (A20). That is, unless either θG is 
adjusted to be consistent with the target rate of inflation or the target rate of inflation is adjusted 
to be consistent with θG, the path of inflation cannot necessarily be determined. Either θG or the 
target rate of inflation need be an endogenous variable. If a central bank dominates, the target 
rate of inflation remains as the key exogenous variable and θG should then be an endogenous 
variable. The reverse is also true.  
 A central bank will be regarded as truly independent if θG is forced to be adjusted to 
the one that is consistent with the target rate of inflation set by the central bank. For example, 
suppose that 
PG θθ   and a truly independent central bank manipulates the nominal interest 
rate according to the Taylor-type instrument rule (Equation [21]). Here, 
 
tG
t
t
s
s
υt πθrdsdυπi   

1
1
                    (A22) 
 
at steady state such that 0tg , 0tx , 0tc , and 0tk
  by Equations (A2), (A10), 
and (A19). If the accelerating inflation rate is higher than the target rate of inflation, the central 
bank can raise the nominal interest rate from 
tGt πθi   (Equation [A22]) to 
 
ψπθi tGt   
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by positive ψ by intervening in financial markets to lower the accelerating rate of inflation. In 
this case, the central bank keeps the initial target rate of inflation because it is truly independent. 
The government thus faces a rate of increase of real obligation that is higher than θG by the extra 
rate ψ.7 If the government lowers θG so that θG < θP and inflation stops accelerating, the central 
bank will accordingly reduce the extra rate ψ. If, however, the government does not 
accommodate θG to the target rate of inflation, the extra rate ψ will increase as time passes 
because of the gap between the accelerating inflation rate and the target rate of inflation widens 
by Equation (A20) and γx in Taylor-type instrument rules is usually larger than unity, say 1.5. 
Because of the extra rate ψ, the government has no other way to achieve optimization unless it 
lowers θG to one that is consistent with the target rate of inflation. Once the government 
recognizes that the central bank is firmly determined to be independent and it is in vain to try to 
intervene in the central bank’s decision makings, the government would not dare to attempt to 
raise θG again anymore. 
 Equation (A20) implies that a government allows inflation to accelerate because it acts 
to maximize its expected utility based only on its own preferences. A government is hardly the 
only entity that cannot easily control its own preferences even when these preferences may 
result in unfavorable consequences. It may not even be possible to manipulate one’s own 
preferences at will. Thus, even though a government is fully rational and is not weak, foolish, or 
untruthful, it is difficult for it to self-regulate its preferences. Hence, an independent neutral 
organization is needed to help control θG. Delegating the authority to set and keep the target rate 
of inflation to an independent central bank is a way to control θG. The delegated independent 
central bank will control θG because it is not the central bank’s preference to stabilize the price 
level—it is simply a duty delegated to it. An independent central bank is not the only possible 
choice. For example, pegging the local currency with a foreign currency can be seen as a kind of 
delegation to an independent neutral organization. In addition, the gold standard that prevailed 
before World War II can be also seen as a type of such delegation. 
 Note also that the delegation may not be viewed as bad from the Leviathan 
government’s point of view because only its rate of time preference is changed, and the 
government can still pursue its political objectives. One criticism of the argument that central 
banks should be independent (e.g., Blinder 1998) is that, since the time-inconsistency problem 
argued in Kydland and Prescott (1977) or Barro and Gordon (1983) is more acute with fiscal 
policy, why is it not also necessary to delegate fiscal policies? An economically Leviathan 
government, however, will never allow fiscal policies to be delegated to an independent neutral 
organization because the Leviathan government would then not be able to pursue its political 
objectives, which in a sense would mean the death of the Leviathan government. The median 
household that backs the Leviathan government, but at the same time dislikes high inflation, 
will therefore support the delegation of authority but only if it concerns monetary policy. The 
independent central bank will then be given the authority to control θG and oblige the 
government to change θG in order to meet the target rate of inflation. 
 Without such a delegation of authority, it is likely that generally θG > θP because θG 
represents the median household whereas θP represents the mean household. Empirical studies 
indicate that the rate of time preference negatively correlates with permanent income (e.g., 
Lawrance 1991), and the permanent income of the median household is usually lower than that 
of the mean household. If generally θG > θP, that suggests that inflation will tend to accelerate 
unless a central bank is independent. The independence of the central bank is therefore very 
important in keeping the path of inflation stable. 
     Note also that the forced adjustments of θG by an independent central bank are exogenous 
                                                          
7 The extra rate ψ affects not only the behavior of government but also that of the representative household, in which 
the conventional inflation theory is particularly interested. In this sense, the central bank’s instrument rule that 
concerns and simultaneously affects both behaviors of the government and the representative household is 
particularly important for price stability. 
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shocks to both the government and the representative household because they are planned solely 
by the central bank. When a shock on θG is given, the government and the representative 
household must recalculate their optimal paths including the path of inflation by resetting θG, πt, 
and φ.     
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